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Class Struggles In Portugal

PAUL M. SWEEZY

The Crisis in India

• AN OBSERVER

Madame Ghandi: Rhetoric And Repression

• HARRY MAGDOFF

Nkrumah's Dream

A REVIEW BY ANN SEIDMAN

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

(*Continued from inside front cover*)

This month's Review of the Month (ROM) grew in the writing, and in view of the extreme paucity of information on what is really happening in Portugal (as far as the United States is concerned, it might be more correct to say nonexistence rather than paucity), we decided to let the process take its course. This ROM therefore turns out to be a very long first part of a two-part piece, to which we have appended a translation of most of an important communiqué issued by the Armed Forces Movement on June 21. The division into two parts, while unfortunate in a way, does have the advantage of making it possible to take into account, in the second part, some of the latest developments, which at the time of going to press (mid-August) look like adding up to a turning point in the Portuguese revolutionary process.

It is with deep sorrow that we record the death from cancer in New York on July 21 of Helen Boyden Lamb, author of MR Press book *Vietnam's Will to Live: Resistance to Foreign Aggression from Early Times through the Nineteenth Century*. Helen was a close friend of many years, as was her first husband Robert Lamb who died in 1952 and her second husband Corliss Lamont who survives. She had been ill for some time, and it was a source of gratification to those of us who knew her well that

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CLASS STRUGGLES IN PORTUGAL

By Paul M. Sweezy

My first inclination was to write on the "Portuguese Revolution," but on further consideration I decided that this choice of title might be more misleading than helpful. In one sense, to be sure, what is happening in Portugal today is most certainly a revolutionary process. The old structure of power has been overturned, and the established pattern of social relations has been thrown into turmoil. What started out as a military coup at the center and top on April 25, 1974, has spread outward and downward to encompass the entire Portuguese social order.

And yet in another sense the question whether or not there will be a revolution in Portugal hangs in the balance. For example, hundreds of factories and other enterprises—no one seems to know the precise number—have been taken over by their workers. Managers have been locked in and/or expelled; and in many cases owners have been jailed or fled the country. The questions of who owns what, who is entitled

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to compensation if any, what form management will take in nationalized and/or occupied plants have not only not been solved but under present circumstances are not even under serious consideration. The all-important problem now is the location and wielding of political power, and unless or until this is resolved nothing much else is likely to be decided. In the meantime nothing irreversible has occurred. Given this state of affairs, it seems clear that what needs to be placed at the center of the analytical focus is the bitter and ubiquitous class struggles which characterize the Portuguese scene, the outcome of which will determine whether or not there will be a real revolution in Portugal.

Class struggles in Portugal, as in all other countries, have their own historically conditioned and in many respects unique characteristics and dialectic. We must therefore attempt at the outset to provide a brief summary of certain essential background information.*

The Portuguese Class Structure

The picture of Portugal as a backward and underdeveloped country, which I assume is widely held in the United States and other advanced capitalist countries, and which was firmly implanted in my own mind before I went there, is basically

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* I have found useful the following readily available sources: Jay O'Brien, "Portugal and Africa: A Dying Colonialism," MR, May 1974; Robin Blackburn, "The Test in Portugal," *New Left Review,* September-December 1974; Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal," *New York Review of Books,* April 17, 1975; Big Flame ("a revolutionary socialist group" in Britain), *Portugal: A Blaze of Freedom,* no date but containing material through May 1975, distributed in the United States by *Radical America,* P.O. Box B, North Cambridge, Ma. 02140 at $1.00 a copy. Most of the Big Flame pamphlet is based on or comes from French and Italian revolutionary socialist publications. In addition, I have tried to make judicious use of a variety of materials, written and oral, collected in a two-and-a-half week visit to Portugal in June 1975. On the Portuguese class structure, e.g., I have relied on the *Programa Politico* of the Movimento de Esquerda Socialista (MES—Movement of the Socialist Left), one of the political groupings to the left of the Communist Party with a base among students and intellectuals as well as in some sectors of the working class. Things are changing so quickly in Portugal now that it is necessary to state that this piece is being written in late July-early August.

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misleading. By U.S. and Western European standards, Portugal is indeed backward, and there is no doubt that most of its people are poor. But on a global scale it is a country which belongs to the developed capitalist camp, not only by reason of its having had until recently a large colonial empire but, more important, because of its socio-economic structure. And this fact gives it an importance in the present world political scene out of all proportion to its area or population. If a revolution should occur in Portugal, it would not be another Third World revolution but the first in a metropolitan capitalist country. And that would certainly be an event of very wide-reaching consequences and implications.

"Portugal is," in the words of the MES Program, "a country in which capitalist relations of production dominate in a quasi-absolute form." Four fifths of the active population are wage and salary workers. Slightly over half of the active population is proletarian in the narrow sense of production workers in factories, shops, and farms; and another 25-30 percent are office and service workers. Industry is heavily concentrated in the two cities of Lisbon and Oporto. Most of the agricultural proletariat, amounting to about a quarter of the proletariat as a whole, is in the Ribetejo and Alentejo regions, i.e., in the central and southern parts of the country.* The northern part of the country is for the most part a region of small, semi-subsistence, family-operated farms, very poor, backward, and church-ridden.

At the other end of the class structure there is—or at least there was until recently—the financial/monopolistic bourgeoisie, organized in a handful of *zaibatsu*-like groups (CUF, Quiná, Espiritu Santo, Champalimaud) controlling most large-scale industry, banking, insurance, communications, etc. These monopolistic combines were nurtured hothouse-fashion by the Salazar dictatorship, acquired vast interests in Portugal's African colonies, and established a whole spiderweb of joint ventures

* Literally, Ribetejo and Alentejo mean "above the Tagus" and "beyond the Tagus," the Tagus being the river which rises in Spain and roughly cuts the country in two, with Lisbon being situated on the magnificent natural harbor formed by the river's mouth.

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and connections with the imperialist bourgeoisies of Europe and America. *De facto* they have for the most part by now been broken up and dispersed, their holdings nationalized, and their leading figures either jailed or in exile. Two consequences of this upheaval call for special notice. First, the anti-monopoly program which at the outset was the basic political orientation of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) as well as the Communist Party and some of the smaller groups on the Left (but not the Socialist Party which has consistently given top priority to the establishment of bourgeois democratic institutions) has lost its *raison d'être*. What has taken or is taking its place, especially as far as the MFA is concerned, will be discussed below. The second consequence of course is that the monopolistic bourgeoisie is thirsting not only to get its holdings back but also for revenge over the upstarts who have so rudely upset its cosy little universe. Given its huge wealth, some of which was already abroad and more of which has been sent abroad (legally and illegally) in the last year, and its international connections, it is obvious that this top stratum of the Portuguese capitalist class, though tiny in numbers, is potentially an extremely dangerous counter-revolutionary force.

Between the mass of wage and salary workers on the one hand and the monopolistic bourgeoisie on the other stands an array of classes characteristic of capitalist countries at a comparable stage of development and accounting for something like 20 percent of the active population. These include both urban and rural strata.

In the city, there are (a) an intermediate industrial and commercial bourgeoisie which overlaps with and is socially hardly distinguishable from the upper levels of salaried workers; (b) professionals of various kinds; (c) government bureaucrats; (d) a quite numerous petty bourgeoisie which is related to the lower levels of salaried workers much as the intermediate bourgeoisie is related to the upper levels; and (e) a subproletariat of chronically under- and unemployed, criminals, prostitutes, and hustlers of all kinds.

In the countryside, there are (a) latifundists, i.e., owners of big estates, particularly in the south, who still practice a

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very inefficient type of agriculture; (b) modern capitalist farmers who are good businessmen but whose agricultural practices are often disastrously irrational from the point of view of the society as a whole;* (c) small commercial farmers, either owners or tenants; (d) semi-proletarians who have some land but not enough to support themselves and who must therefore also work for others (here we also include the already-mentioned impoverished minifundists of the north).

In sum, Portugal's class structure is that of a metropolitan capitalist country at a somewhat lower stage of development than the more advanced countries of Europe and North America.** And as we know from a great deal of historical experiences such a society is characterized by continuous and at times severe, though normally containable, class struggles. What marks Portugal as a very special case is that during almost the whole period when this class structure was taking shape (i.e., from 1926 on), the class struggles generated by it were not only contained but brutally suppressed by the longest-lived fascist regime on record. Moreover, in being repressed their latent bitterness and severity were magnified. For example, keeping wages low was a calculated part of the strategy of the Salazar dictatorship, and this required not only banning independent unions and suppressing strikes but also a deliberate policy of maintaining low food prices, which in turn squeezed the agricultural sector and was in no small part responsible for the impoverishment and depopulation of potentially productive farm areas. At the same time the privileges so generously handed out to the monopolistic bourgeoisie raised the prices of many articles of popular consumption and further

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* On this see the very instructive analysis of Marcel Mazoyer in René Dumont, *Development and Socialisms* (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 277-290.

** In particular, the agricultural classes are relatively more numerous and the service sector relatively smaller. But it is not correct to say, as Jay O'Brien does in the MR article cited above, that "agriculture still employs the bulk of the work force." That was true until roughly the middle of the twentieth century; but Portugal, in common with the rest of Western Europe, has undergone a fairly rapid process of capitalist development in the years since the Second World War.

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skewed the unequal distribution of income normal to capitalist societies. Among the more outrageous measures in this respect was the banning, under severe penalties, of the production in Portugal of tobacco, cotton, and sugar beets, in order to reserve the market for these commodities for the monopolists' estates and plantations in the colonies—and this in spite of the fact that the soil and climate of Portugal are well suited to the production of these crops.

Against this background it is easy to understand why, when the iron hand of fascist repression was lifted following the April 25 coup, all hell broke loose. Workers staged hundreds of strikes for higher wages, locked up bosses until their demands were met, occupied factories and offices, demanded purges throughout the public and private sector (*saneamento* is one of the most frequently seen and heard words in Portugal today). Demonstrations of support of workers' struggles or of protest against official inaction or opposition, often involving people from many strata of the urban population, became an almost daily occurrence. Street-corner orators, surrounded by knots of excited debaters, could be seen late into the night. Landless peasants seized large estates or squatted on untilled land. Villagers took over unoccupied houses of departed landlords or capitalists for use as schools or nurseries or as shelter for the homeless. At the other end of the social spectrum the bourgeoisie—suffering considerable losses, threatened with much greater ones, and thoroughly frightened—began to gather its forces, both inside and outside the country, and to plot its return to power. And in between, tens and hundreds of thousands of "small people," kept in abysmal ignorance and fed a steady diet of lurid anti-Communist propaganda through a half century of fascist rule, soon showed all the signs of being ready to serve as shock troops of reaction and counter-revolution.

This boiling over of the political pot was naturally accompanied by severe economic tensions and dislocations. Old authority structures broke down without being replaced by new ones; both productivity and production declined; unemployment increased and inflation continued at one of the highest rates in Europe. In its communiqué of June 21, 1975, the

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Armed Forces Movement described the economic state of the nation in the following terms:*

The present economic situation of the country is characterized by the following three basic critical points:

(a) Very aggravated disequilibrium in the balance of payments, portending a deficit by the end of the current year much larger than that realized in 1974, which was of the order of 17 billion escudos [$680 million at the current 25 escudos = 1 dollar rate of exchange].

(b) High unemployment, amounting to around 250,000 unemployed, equal to 8 percent of the active population.

(c) Declining domestic production, posing a threat to national independence and, unless present production conditions are modified, leading by the end of the year to a decrease in the Gross National Product compared to 1974 of the order of 6 percent.

It hardly needs to be emphasized that a situation like this —both in its political and in its economic aspects—is extremely unstable and certain to generate a whole series of probably increasingly severe crises. But what the outcome will be—what new political and economic arrangements will be arrived at and by what route—cannot now be foreseen. The best we can do is attempt to analyze the main forces and tendencies at work and seek to uncover some *possible* outcomes. The point of such an exercise is not to indulge in idle speculation but to achieve as clear an understanding as possible of a situation which is of enormous international and historical importance and which most certainly demands the taking and defending of positions by all politically conscious people, both inside and outside Portugal.

The Armed Forces Movement. The MFA is a uniquely Portuguese phenomenon. It organized and carried through the coup of April 25, has played a key role in events since then, and will almost certainly continue to do so in the future. It must be understood in terms of its own origins and development, and any temptation to treat it as merely a garden-variety military intervention in politics must be resolutely resisted. That

* This communiqué is printed, with minor omissions, on pp. 27-38 below, and its significance is commented upon further along in the present text.

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way lies total incomprehension of the Portuguese revolutionary process.

The MFA had its roots in the liberation struggles of Portugal's African colonies (Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola). In its effort to retain control of these colonies the Portuguese dictatorship, beginning in the early 1960s, committed manpower and resources, enormous in relation to the population and wealth of the country, to continuous military campaigns against the colonial insurgencies. By the early 1970s it was increasingly clear to everyone concerned that this effort was doomed to fail. Nevertheless, the MFA did not begin as an antiwar movement: its original relation to the African wars was more indirect. As had happened in the case of France's colonial wars in the 1950s, Portugal's effort in Africa depleted its officer corps and made necessary resort to extraordinary measures to remedy the shortages.* This caused dissatisfaction among junior officers who had gone through the old system and felt they were being slighted in favor of newcomers. The MFA began as a kind of professional association of these junior officers to obtain redress of their grievances. But once they began to meet they soon discovered that they had many other problems to discuss, including of course the losing African wars in which many of the young officers had been directly engaged for most of their military careers. It was from these discussions that the plot to overthrow the dictatorship emerged. General Spínola, whose pre-coup book *Portugal and the Future* attracted world-wide attention by calling for a political (albeit neocolonialist) solution of the African wars, was informed of the plotting and accepted the MFA's invitation to become head of the first provisional government, but he was not directly involved. Spínola and others he drew into his administration hoped and intended to gain undisputed control of the situation and to use their power to reshape Portugal as a modernized European capitalist state.

But the MFA had other ideas. Its original program was populist, anti-monopolist, and anti-colonialist—vague on many

* For details see the article by Kenneth Maxwell cited in the footnote on p. 2 above.

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crucial points but clearly incompatible with the ideology and ambitions of the Spinolistas.* From the very outset a clash between these two forces was inevitable, and it was not long in developing. In July of 1974, as working-class struggles intensified on the economic front, Spínola and his conservative prime minister, Palma Carlos, attempted to engineer what Robin Blackburn has aptly called a presidentialist putsch—a plebiscite within three months to make Spínola a sort of Portuguese version of de Gaulle. However, this crude initiative was overwhelmingly rejected by the Council of State. Palma Carlos was forced to resign and was replaced as prime minister by General Vasco Gonçalves, reportedly a long-time sympathizer of the Communist Party. His reconstituted cabinet now included four ministers from the MFA.

Thus was born the second provisional government, but its tenure was even shorter than that of its predecessor. Spínola

* It is often said that the radical stance of the MFA derived from certain experiences of its members in Africa—their study of the ideology and strategy of the liberation movements, discussions with African prisoners, etc. While this was no doubt true in some cases, I am inclined to doubt its validity as a generalization. Certainly in many cases the radicalizing impact of the African wars was more direct. Soldiers (including junior officers) forced to fight for years on end far away from home under conditions of extreme hardship and with no chance of winning are quite capable of generating their own brand of anti-imperialism. Add to this certain other facts: the sorry state of the Portuguese economy and society, vastly aggravated by the wars' drain on the country's resources; the membership of most of the soldiers in the classes specially victimized by these conditions; and the manifestly privileged and luxurious style of life of the tiny minority which lived from the exploitation of both the African and the Portuguese peoples. That a movement to overthrow the dictatorship and end the wars should also favor radical reforms at home hardly needs a special explanation. My own skepticism about the importance of the African ideological influence was reinforced by a personal incident. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to meet one of the original MFA members, now a captain still in his twenties and commander of a barracks in the Lisbon region, as it turned out an extremely impressive person and a committed Marxist revolutionary. I was prepared for an account of African experiences and was therefore surprised at the outset to hear that he had never been out of Europe. He was an advanced-weapons specialist who had been sent for training to France where he lived for a couple of years and married a French woman. Revolutionary ideas circulate through many channels these days!

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soon resumed his maneuvering, and the reactionaries connected with the old regime became increasingly bold. On September 10 Spínola called on the "silent majority" to assert itself, and a major demonstration in his support was announced for September 28. This time, organizations of the working class, suspecting an imminent attempt at a coup and apparently led by several of the far-left groups, seized the initiative on the night of September 27 by setting up barricades on all roads leading into Lisbon. Spínola, as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, tried to make use of troops of the Continental Operations Command (COPCON) to remove the barricades and make sure that the demonstration could take place as scheduled.* But he discovered that the troops would only take orders from the COPCON commander, General Otelo de Carvalho who, while still a major, had directed the coup against Caetano on April 25. Instead, COPCON was ordered to reinforce the workers on the barricades; the demonstration was banned; and dozens of plotters were arrested. With this,

* COPCON is often described as a security force, or even as the MFA's political police. In the interest of accuracy it is therefore important to be clear as to just what it really is. In an interview with the Italian left-socialist paper, *Lotta Continua* (May 12, 1975), Carvalho was asked: "When was COPCON set up? What's its exact purpose? To what extent is it a parallel body to the high command?" This was his answer: "It's important to be clear about this. The army high command has administrative and material functions which are important at a time of general reorganization. COPCON was set up at a time of crisis for the first provisional government, last July, when the Spinolist prime minister Palma Carlos was sent packing and replaced by Vasco Gonçalves. It's concerned with operational tasks. It's the command HQ for the whole army in Portugal. Apart from this, it has at its direct disposal certain forces of intervention, such as RAL 1 [Light Artillery Regiment No. 1], as well as two parachute companies and the marine detachment which are always at our disposal. On the other hand, we don't have permanent call on naval and air units. Still, if the need arises, we can use them, as we did on March 11 [1975], when we needed to carry out aerial reconnaissance, as well as during the elections. COPCON also has the means to take effective operational control of the whole country, centralizing its actions through the various regional HQs." (Translation in the Big Flame pamphlet cited in footnote, p. 2.) From this description it will be seen that while it is not wrong to call COPCON a security force, it is also not very helpful, and that it is very wrong to call it a political police. Another point that emerges quite clearly is the key position occupied by Carvalho in the whole MFA/armed forces setup.

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Spínola's power base collapsed. Two days later, on September 30, he resigned and was replaced as president by his old friend and associate, General Francisco da Costa Gomes, thus ushering in the third provisional government.

The history of the third provisional government was in many ways similar to that of its predecessors. In each case the struggle within the government was essentially a reflection of the developing class struggles in the larger society, with the working class manifestly growing in militancy and organizational strength and the bourgeoisie striking back in an attempt to regain control of the situation. The MFA once again tried to temporize, no doubt largely because divisions within its own ranks prevented it from formulating and acting upon a strategy clearly favoring one or the other of the two dominant class forces. And once again its hand was forced by an attempted coup from the Right, this time on March 11, 1975.

Militarily the putsch of March 11 was easily defeated. Politically it had far-reaching consequences. Spínola and some of his associates fled the country; others were jailed. But more important was an explosion of working-class activity. A large proportion of factory occupations took place in the immediate aftermath of March 11, forcing the government to greatly extend the scope of its nationalization program. It was then that the fate of the monopolistic conglomerates was sealed, though the biggest of them all, the Companhia União Fabril (CUF), was not taken over until several months later. March 11 also speeded up the formation of non-party factory and neighborhood commissions, a process which had been begun several months earlier under the leadership of some of the far-left groups.

The MFA reacted to the new situation in several ways. For one thing it formalized its own structure. Ultimate authority was placed in a 240-man general assembly (120 from the army and 60 each from the navy and the air force), with noncoms and privates participating as well as officers. Also set up was a High Council of the Revolution of 30 officers which in effect became the country's governing body. Second and more important, the MFA decided that it could not take the risk of

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allowing the elections, scheduled for April 25, anniversary of the original coup, to become the basis of a new power structure centered in the political parties. Acting through the Council of the Revolution, it therefore prepared a "Platform of Constitutional Agreement with the Political Parties," which the latter were in effect obliged to sign as a condition of participating in the elections. The gist of the platform was simply that the MFA would retain power for a transitional period of three to five years and that the assembly elected on April 25 would have as its sole function the writing of a constitution which would serve for the transition period—and which, in addition, would have to "consecrate the principles of the program of the Armed Forces Movement, the legitimate conquests achieved in the course of the [revolutionary] process, as well as the developments of the program imposed by the revolutionary dynamic which openly and irreversibly commits the country to an original path to a Portuguese socialism." Not too much left for the constitutional assembly to decide, it would seem!

The MFA doubtless would have liked to skip the elections altogether, but it was stuck with them as a result of a promise made the year before at a time when hardly anyone, and certainly not the MFA itself, anticipated that the overthrow of the dictatorship would precipitate a profound revolutionary process. It is, I think, a sign of the growing maturity of the MFA as a serious revolutionary force that when such a process did develop, it was unwilling to allow it to be cut short and very likely rudely reversed by what could perhaps best be described as an electoral coup. The MFA probably thought that the Platform of Constitutional Agreement with the Political Parties was the best way to insure against such a coup without violating the pledge to hold elections; and that may well have been the wisest political course in the circumstances that existed following the defeat of the March 11 putsch. But there is no doubt that a heavy price had to be paid. The fact that nearly two thirds of the votes were collected by two quintessentially bourgeois parties masquerading as "socialist" and "social democratic" has given invaluable ammunition to the enemies of the Portu-

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guese revolution, both inside and outside the country.* With the benefit of hindsight, one can speculate that it might have been better to postpone the elections for an indefinite period or, as some suggested at the time, run non-party MFA candidates who certainly would have drawn many of the votes that actually went to the Socialist and Popular Democratic Parties and who might even have won a plurality. General Carvalho's opinion on this is worth quoting:

> The MFA has had an amazing impact at a mass level. If we'd taken part in the elections we'd have won. The truth is that the parties don't have very deep roots, and they also fight among each other to the extent of threatening the unity of the base. We have to fight the big bourgeoisie which lays down the PPD's [Popular Democratic Party's] political line, of course. The struggle between the parties is maybe a distraction, which puts us in a difficult position. But that doesn't mean we're thinking of taking on the task of mass mobilization, even if that were possible for the MFA. The MFA needs the parties, and of course the parties need the MFA, if we're to achieve socialism.**

We shall return to the role of the parties presently: here we merely note that a more astute policy on the part of the MFA might have diluted or even altogether obviated the propaganda bonanza which the elections presented gratis to the MFA's enemies. It should hardly be necessary to add that in other respects the significance of the elections was minimal. They had no effect on the underlying class struggle, and the constitutional assembly which resulted is a pointless sideshow.

The foregoing summary of the MFA's first year in power clearly indicates a process of radicalization and growing com-

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* Engels somewhere remarked that it was a sure thing that on the day after the revolution the entire opposition would be solidly united under the banner of pure democracy. One appreciates the profundity of the observation when one reads day after day in the *New York Times* and other loyal apologists of capitalism and imperialism about the dreadful violations of democracy (and socialism too, no less!) perpetrated by the wicked Portuguese militarists. And if someone says to me that I malign the Portuguese Socialist Party by calling it bourgeois and tries to drive home the point with the assertion that it is no more bourgeois than most of the other European socialist parties, I answer: Exactly so—neither more nor less.

** Interview cited in footnote, p. 10.

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mitment to the revolution. But it is important to understand that this was definitely not an autonomous process originating inside the MFA but rather a process generated by and reflective of the class struggle raging outside the centers of power. While generally reluctant to take sides in this struggle, the MFA was unable to avoid involvement in the three decisive confrontations which marked this first year. In each case it threw its support to the working class and in so doing kept the revolution alive and impelled itself to move further to the Left. Whether this dialectic will repeat itself, perhaps even to the point of becoming one of the characteristic (and, incidentally, historically unique) forms of development of the Portuguese revolution, remains to be seen. At this stage all we can say is that it seems to be a distinct possibility.

I have neither the space nor the necessary documentation to trace this leftward movement of the MFA since April 25, 1974, but I do want to call attention to a landmark declaration of policy issued on June 21 by the Revolutionary Council after almost a week of near-continuous meetings. Since returning from Portugal at the end of June, I have not been able to locate an English translation of this important document, so I assume it is known here only through newspaper accounts. Hence I include as an appendix a rough translation of the text, with a few minor omissions, as it appeared in the newspaper *O Comércio do Porto* of June 22. The whole document should be read, since a coherent summary is impossible. The following notes are intended to help put it in historical perspective.

As remarked earlier, the original program of the MFA was anti-monopolist and anti-colonialist but certainly not anti-capitalist. I'm not sure when this began to change to a pro-socialist orientation—probably some time after the departure of Spínola from the government in September. But as late as April the Platform of Constitutional Agreement with the Political Parties speaks of the country as being on the way to "a Portuguese socialism" which sounds much more like an all too familiar kind of demagogy ("Arab socialism," "African socialism," etc.) than a serious political commitment. In the June 21 communiqué, however, matters are clearer. Section 1.1 states that the MFA is a movement of national liberation

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with the essential object of national independence and that it recognizes that this can be attained only through the construction of a socialist society. Section 1.2 identifies a socialist society as "the final objective to be achieved" and defines it as "a society without classes, obtained by the collectivization of the means of production, eliminating all forms of exploitation of man by man, and in which there will be granted to all individuals equal opportunities for education, work, and advancement without distinction of birth, sex, religious belief, or ideology." To this it adds: "The road of transition from the present society to a socialist society necessarily passes through various phases of which the first is marked by the transition period fixed in the Platform of Constitutional Agreement, and the steps of which will be determined by the political and socio-economic evolution of the Portuguese people."

From a Marxist point of view these statements are open to serious criticism. A society without classes is communist, not socialist. Socialism is precisely a transitional society moving *away* from capitalism and *toward* communism.* But the transition does not begin with a declaration like the Platform of Constitutional Agreement but rather with the accession of the working class to political power. Despite these weaknesses, however, the conception of socialism at which the MFA has now arrived is quite consistent with a genuinely revolutionary orientation, and it is capable of being modified and deepened without being negated. In short it is not a piece of ideological obfuscation like so many of the "socialisms" being bandied about in the world today. Furthermore, the unqualified statement that national independence can be won only through the construction of a socialist society is more, not less, true when socialism is understood in its full Marxist sense.

Immediately after setting out its definition of socialism, however, the MFA falls into a contradiction, probably reflecting some combination of disunity in its own ranks, political naiveté, and a fear of shocking liberals and bourgeois demo-

* The question as to how to characterize a society which has started the transition and then either got stuck or turned back is among the most important unsettled issues in Marxist theory. For purposes of the present analysis, fortunately, we do not need to take a position on this.

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crats at home and abroad. "However," we are told, "the MFA has already determined that this path [i.e., to socialism] will be made by the pluralist route." And "pluralism" is then defined in Section 1.3 as follows:

> Pluralism means free expression and discussion of opinions, as well as experiences in the construction of the new society, in an open and permanent dialogue with all the Portuguese people.
>
> Socialist pluralism comprehends the coexistence in theory and practice of various forms and conceptions of construction of socialist society. At the same time, the MFA rejects the implantation of socialism by violent and dictatorial methods.
>
> Party pluralism, as is stated in the Platform of Constitutional Agreement, implies the recognition of the existence of various political parties and currents of opinion, even if they do not necessarily defend socialist options. At the same time, it admits an opposition whose criticism can be beneficial and constructive provided its actions do not oppose the construction of socialist society by democratic means.

As a statement of intentions this is one thing; as a statement of binding principles, which seems to be what is meant, it is something quite different—and dangerous. At a time like the present in Portugal when the enemies of socialism—and they are numerous and potentially very powerful—are on the defensive, they are not going to come forward as such. They are going to declare themselves for "socialist options"; they are going to swear that what they are offering is "beneficial and constructive opposition"; and they are going to leave no stone unturned in their determination to sidetrack the revolution into a capitalist dead end. As this is written, little more than a month after the issuance of the communiqué of June 21, with the Socialist and Popular Democratic Parties having pulled out of the coalition government (the fourth provisional government dating from March 25), and with "anti-Communist" violence spreading in the reactionary areas of the north, this is becoming increasingly obvious to everyone, including the MFA itself, which is groping for a way to meet the challenge as it has met previous challenges from the Right. But how much of pluralism as defined in the communiqué will survive this round in the class struggle remains to be seen. The lesson to be learned, and the sooner the better, is that you cannot be com-

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mitted both to socialism and to a particular way of achieving socialism. As a wealth of historical experience has shown, most recently in Chile, the enemies of socialism do not play by anyone's rules. If socialists themselves nevertheless insist on laying down a set of rules to which they propose to adhere, they will sooner or later find themselves in an excruciating dilemma: either break their word or accept defeat.

There is one other point in the communiqué to which I would like to call special attention since it could be of importance in the future development of the MFA. In Part 2 ("Exercise of Authority") two dangers to the revolution are identified: first, counter-revolutionary activities by the agents of capitalism and colonialism; and second, "certain manifestations of pseudo-revolutionary leftism [which], even if sometimes well-intentioned, tend to create anarchical situations profoundly upsetting to a coherent revolutionary process and resulting objectively in strengthening the game which they claim or pretend to be combating." The former, according to the communiqué, will be severely repressed. It then adds that "with respect to the struggle against leftism, it should be carried out essentially in the ideological field, making possible the recovery of well-intentioned elements for the objectives and tasks of the revolution."* Here we can discern, at least in embryo, a recognition of the extremely important distinction between two kinds of contradictions: on the one hand contradictions between the people and their enemies, and on the other hand contradictions among the people. Under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung, this recognition has become one of the cornerstones of the theory and practice of the Chinese Communist Party. In contrast it is completely foreign to the traditional Moscow-oriented Communist Parties which invariably treat their rivals on the Left as though they were indeed "agents of capitalism and colonialism"

* The main "leftist" target of concern to the MFA has been the MRPP (Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat) which is virulently sectarian and provocative, calling the MFA "fascist" and the Communist Party "social fascist" and deliberately courting arrests to prove its point. According to newspaper reports, however, when mob violence in the north began to escalate in July, arrested members of the MRPP were released from jail in a move to solidify the forces capable of resisting the counter-revolutionaries.

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and in this way seek to lay the basis for destroying them at the first opportunity. The Portuguese Communist Party is no exception in this respect—far from it.

Developments in the Armed Forces. So far we have been considering the MFA, which started as a handful of officers and even now, with the addition of representatives of noncoms and privates, includes only a small proportion of the total personnel of the armed forces. But no analysis of the Portuguese situation which leaves the mass of rank-and-file soldiers out of account could be other than seriously incomplete. To convince oneself of this, one need only recall some basic facts about the military establishment which evolved during close to a decade and a half of colonial wars. A concise description is provided by Kenneth Maxwell:

> In a population of a little over eight million, one in four men of military age is in the armed forces. The army alone contained at least 170,000 men in 1974, of which 135,000 were in Africa. The air force had 16,000 men, the navy 18,000, the units of the Republican Guard (GNR) 10,000, and the paramilitary security police (PSP) 15,000. The armed forces represented (at a low estimate) a proportion per thousand of the population (30.83) exceeded only by Israel (40.09) and North and South Vietnam (31.66) (55.36); five times that of the UK, three times that of the US or Spain. The military budget represented 7 percent of GNP, more than that of the US. And that too was a percentage probably based on figures that were gross underestimations. With a per capita income of just over $1,000, Portugal spent a minimum per capita of $63.27 on military expenditure. Notwithstanding, the officers had abysmal salaries, while for the troops pay was token or nonexistent. Its private soldiers were and remain for the most part illiterate, badly trained, and at times tenuously disciplined. (Article cited in footnote on p. 2.)

Given these facts, it would be rather absurd to assume that an upheaval of the magnitude of that which engulfed Portugal after the April 25 coup would affect and be affected by only the tiny minority of officers and men who belong to the MFA.

As far as the non-MFA officers are concerned, I was told by several persons questioned that most of the reactionary and potentially counter-revolutionary ones had been purged or retired and that the great majority of those remaining on active

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duty would go along with the MFA. The trouble with this diagnosis is that it ignores the fact that the MFA itself is anything but a monolithic force. When the class struggle heats up, as is clearly happening at the time of writing, it penetrates deeply into the MFA, causing divisions and conflicts, generating crises, and forcing changes in leadership and political direction. Up to now, as we have already seen, these crises within the MFA have been resolved in favor of the more radical tendency. But there is no guarantee that this will always be the case. Unfortunately, I have no information on the political orientation of the non-MFA officer corps, but I think it is reasonable to assume that they are generally less politicized and more conservative than the MFA officers. If this is correct, it is not hard to imagine a situation in which the less radical wing of the MFA would seek to make a tactical alliance with the outside officers in an attempt to tip the balance in its favor. Newspaper reports from Lisbon during the last few days (August 7-10) suggest that this may indeed be happening right now. In any case the ambiguities of the situation, taken together with the near certainty that further and probably more severe crises lie ahead, make it a matter of great importance to try to understand what has been happening among the noncoms and privates, who of course constitute the vast majority of the armed forces. For if the class struggle has penetrated deeply into the officer corps, most of whose members are of bourgeois or petty bourgeois origin, it is hardly likely to have left untouched the rank-and-file soldiers who in their great majority are from the urban and rural working classes.

In pursuing this subject, I shall focus on what I observed and was told on a visit to the barracks of the Regiment of Engineers No. 1 on the outskirts of Lisbon. This was the command post for the April 25 coup, and in other respects too it is an outstanding rather than a typical unit. About 700 soldiers live in or are attached to the barracks. Most of the noncoms and privates are mechanically trained, and workers by background. The officers for the most part are graduates in engineering from civilian schools, politically aware and open to ideas. After the end of the fighting in Africa a great deal of equipment was sent back to Portugal, and much of the necessary

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repair work was done in the Regiment's shops. From the very beginning of the new regime, the soldiers wanted to play a political role, but as long as Spínola was in power they were prevented from doing so by regulations and prohibitions of a kind familiar in all bourgeois armies. A struggle for elementary freedoms (to discuss, hold meetings, etc.) was begun in July 1974 but met with repression. Then on September 28 the soldiers went out on the barricades with the workers. The defeat of the attempted coup opened the way for political and cultural action by the soldiers. Rapid advances were scored on two fronts: *internal* through democratization of the life of the barracks, and *external* through establishment of regional and national assemblies of the MFA. On December 10 a turning point was reached with the establishment and formalization of a regimental assembly. According to my guide, a politically active sergeant, the charter of this assembly then became a model for units all over the country. I did not interpret this to mean that units elsewhere literally copied the charter formulated by the Regiment of Engineers No. 1 but rather that other units were encouraged to take similar action, using the Engineers' charter as an example to be adapted to their specific needs. But even if it does no more than indicate in a general way the kind and scope of internal democracy which spread throughout the units of Portugal's armed forces during the winter and spring of 1974-1975, the Engineers' charter seems to me to be an important document worth reproducing in full. The translation is from a mimeographed sheet distributed by the assembly's Committee on Information and Cultural Action.

REGIMENT OF ENGINEERS No. 1

Assembly of the Unit

I — Constitution of the Assembly

Art. 1. The Assembly of the Unit is made up of representatives of officers, sergeants, and soldiers of the Regiment.

Art. 2. *Ex officio* membership in the Assembly is held by the first and second commanders of the unit, as well as by the representative of the National Assembly of the MFA and the director of instruction.

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Art. 3. The remaining members of the Assembly of the unit are chosen by election among all the elements of the class to which they belong. The mandate is for three months, renewable for a period not to exceed twelve months in all.

Art. 4. The number of representatives of each class is in principle the following:

— 2 officers (Q.P.) [Q.P.=*Quadro Permanente*—professional officer corps.]
— 4 officers (Q.C.) [Q.C.=*Quadro Complemento*—reserve officer corps.]
— 4 sergeants (Q.P.)
— 4 sergeants (Q.C.)
—12 soldiers (3 from each company)

This number can be changed by decision of the Assembly itself.

Art. 5. Supplementary members of the Assembly should be named by election in the same numbers as effective members.

II — Powers of the Assembly

Art. 6. The Assembly shall have functions which are consultative, educational, and informative, constituting the organ on which should rely the command of the unit and the representatives of the regional and national assemblies in order to understand better the problems and necessities of the generality of military people.

Art. 7. The assembly will discuss all matters of interest to the unit and will promote through its members and through committees or groups specially named the fuller discussion of these same problems.

Art. 8. Through a Committee on Information and Cultural Action made up from its own membership, the Assembly will promote debates, meetings, colloquiums, courses, etc., designed to keep well informed and to improve the education of all military personnel of the unit. At the same time it will devote particular attention to the elaboration and distribution of written information via wall newspapers, informative leaflets, and a newspaper of the unit.

Art. 9. The Assembly will discuss and decide upon measures to propose to the commander of the unit to assure the progressive improvement of the welfare of the military personnel, with particular attention to the class of soldiers.

Art. 10. The Assembly will discuss the plans of instruction to be adopted in the unit and in particular those which refer to the socio-political education of all military personnel which will necessarily be included in all future schemes of instruction.

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Art. 11. In general the Assembly will discuss the disciplinary problems of the unit with a view to a more humane application of justice in the interpretation of the rules in force, including a greater accuracy and opportunity in the attribution of praise.

Art. 12. It will be up to the Assembly itself to make good any omissions in this set of rules with respect to the definition of the precise limits of its attributions.

III — Functioning of the Assembly

Art. 13. The Assembly will meet in regular weekly sessions on a day to be established by the Assembly itself.

Art. 14. In case of necessity and on call of not less than half of its effective members or of the unit commander an extraordinary meeting can be held not less than 24 hours after the date of convocation.

Art. 15. The Assembly will be under a directorate composed of the first and second commanders and the director of instruction; and the representative of the national assembly will act as secretary, and the first commander as chairman, or in his absence the second commander.

Art. 16. Those constituting the directorate do not have the right to vote.

Art. 17. Convocations of regular or extraordinary meetings will be accompanied by an agenda which will necessarily include the reading of the minutes of the preceding meeting.

Art. 18. Decisions of the Assembly will always be confirmed by an open vote, those proposals being considered approved which pass by a simple majority.

Art. 19. In special cases defined by the Assembly itself, voting may be by secret ballot and by either an absolute majority or two thirds.

Art. 20. The Assembly can dissolve itself by its own decision, the necessary condition being a vote by secret ballot and two thirds of the total possible number of votes.

Proposal approved by the Unit Assembly on 10 December 1974

Center for Information on Cultural Action (C.I.A.C.)

On the face of it this certainly does not appear to be a particularly radical document. And yet if one stops to consider the extremes to which bourgeois armies go to prevent the rank and file from being exposed to radical ideas and democratic experiences, one may well conclude that this appearance is misleading. In Chile even under the Popular Unity government, political work in the armed forces was rigidly banned, and this

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was undoubtedly an important reason why the junta which overthrew the government in September 1973 was able to rely on the army as an anti-popular and repressive force. I was shown the room in which the Committee on Information and Cultural Action displayed and distributed or sold literature. The Portuguese left parties were well represented as were the Marxist classics and contemporary revolutionary works by both Portuguese and foreign authors (including Monthly Review Press books translated into Portuguese and published in Brazil). And not only was left literature readily available; so also were the facilities and the freedom to organize discussion groups and carry on political education. How widespread this situation is in the armed forces around the country I do not know, but at any rate there do not appear to have been any regulations or formal policies of the MFA or the chiefs of the various services which would prevent the carrying on of cultural and educational work among the rank and file. My guide was not only proud of what had been done at the engineers' regiment but also convinced of the national importance of similar activities elsewhere. To emphasize the point, and by way of comparison, he recounted the story of a visit to the regiment by a group from Lotta Continua, the Italian revolutionary socialist organization. These comrades, he said, almost lost their minds when they saw what their Portuguese counterparts were able to do in their work with the military. The Italians would have given their eye-teeth for similar opportunities at home where the rank-and-file soldiers are also mostly poor and uneducated (and subjected to continuous brainwashing by various forms of bourgeois propaganda). But of course anything like that is completely out of the question in "democratic" Italy.

As added evidence of what has been happening within the armed forces it may be worthwhile to quote the following exchange from the interview with Carvalho which has already been cited:

Q. To begin with, what changes have taken place inside the armed forces in the last few months [i.e., before early May]?

A. After April 25 we wanted there and then to take the revolution into the armed forces, to make it felt at every level and in every section. Initially, and until September 28, we tried to

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develop political education work in every unit, but this was blocked by the Chief of Staff, at that time General Silverio Marques. It was hard to make any progress at all. Since September 28 things have got clearer and from then onwards we've been setting up a really democratic kind of organization within the armed forces. Various kinds of assembly have been set up.

After March 11, further changes. Everything was getting clearer, and the process—which goes forward by stages—took on a more distinct form, so we set up a new MFA general assembly, including soldiers, sergeants, and officers. So now the soldiers have full rights of representation in the most powerful MFA body, and that is very important because it allows them, at a regional level and in the different sections, to take an active part in the process of renovation. Recently there was a conference, the first conference for the sailors, which ended with about three thousand sailors present. They called it, and they invited to it various members of the Revolutionary Council, including Pinheiro de Azevedo, head of the Navy's high command. It was an amazing conference. It was a perfect example of how strongly based the democratic organization is becoming. For us, democracy in the heart of the armed forces means every rank taking part in the revolution. Everyone should put forward their own ideas. The meetings and assemblies are the means through which the revolution reaches into every corner. Nothing should be hidden, we've got to be able to discuss everything frankly. Certainly, there are difficulties.

Q. What's the relationship between the growth of democracy in the barracks and the military's links with the outside world, with the struggle that's developing in the country?

A. That link is only beginning to become firm now. The key question is political consciousness. Certainly it's matured extraordinarily fast this year, but you shouldn't forget that until April 25 we lived under an oppressive stopper. Soldiers couldn't talk politics, and politics was kept out of the barracks; everything was under cover. After the liberation, as I said, the advances have been enormous. They've come out of our experiences. The political parties, counting on the depoliticization of the armed forces, thought they'd be able to stage a rapid takeover of the military. The Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) was the first to reach the barracks, followed by the Socialists, then the extreme Left, all trying to get their oar in. At present the extreme Left has the biggest influence, especially among the soldiers, but still the majority—more than those who support the parties—stick to the MFA's ideas. The MFA isn't a party and I think it should remain a separate political organization, obviously leaning to the Left, but above all the parties. Without its own cut-and-dried ideology, but able to hold sway throughout the armed forces.

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Q. The latest MFA bulletin is very critical of the bourgeois-democratic model, talking specifically of the necessity to build "popular power." How can the military support the growth of mass organizations and help proletarian control to take hold in every sector of society?

A. What I would like to see, which is for me the main aim in the armed forces, is the transformation of the regular forces into a people's army. I think this would be possible under certain conditions.

Beginning in the late fifties, our armed forces began to undergo a process of proletarianization. Previously, the officers came exclusively from the ruling classes, who wanted a military career for their sons. Then, partly as a result of the spread of schooling, lower-class youngsters started joining the armed forces too. Because of this the officers have been able to take part in an upheaval which could be to the benefit of the working classes. The "coup" has had a left tinge because so far we've been able to get rid of a large number of the senior ranks compromised with the old regime. The reactionaries, the aristocrats, the ones who wouldn't accept the new democracy, have been thrown out, so in today's conditions the armed forces have taken on a definite orientation to the people.

For a short time now we've been looking at the possibility of having a single entrance system. So that instead of automatic commissions for people coming out of the universities, we would like, through a general entrance, to select the men suitable for command, regardless of their class background, so as to give workers the opportunity to become officers and to enable the lawyers to become soldiers. This would be a clear step in the direction of a people's army, while retaining for the time being the regular structure.

Q. How free are the soldiers to organize themselves?

A. Discipline has to be maintained in some form, and the hierarchy has a function too, because you can't achieve anything positive without a minimum of order and method. In the barracks, at every level, there are all kinds of moves toward equality and the abolition of privileges.

Rations are already equal for everybody, and there are moves to setting up single messing facilities for soldiers and officers, but maybe the soldiers themselves prefer to keep their autonomy, and that isn't a bad thing.

Q. What do you think of the "revolutionary councils," the idea of setting up common grass-roots organizations bringing together workers, soldiers, and the progressive officers?

A. I'm not in disagreement with the setting up of revolution-

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ary councils. In fact, I'm quite favorable to them. It's an experience, like others, which shows that some sections of the people are ready for a total revolution. They get organized, put forward new ideas, go forward; this can only be very positive.

Still, I think that revolutionary councils don't correspond to the present situation. Conditions aren't yet ripe because they would have to be transformed by a powerful mass movement. From this point of view, they're not really strong enough.

As far as the soldiers and officers are concerned, I think that that kind of organizational experience could lead to a better link with the workers and therefore to clarifying their ideas and perspectives. But that still doesn't rule out the need for internal organization. Inside the units it's a good thing that soldiers and officers are getting organized, making decisions, criticizing and re-ordering life in the barracks.

It would of course be highly desirable to have a great deal more concrete evidence about what is going on in military units around the country, but even on the basis of what has been presented it seems justified to conclude that an important process of consciousness raising and politicization is taking place in the Portuguese armed forces. How far this has gone and where it is leading, however, are questions to which no answers are yet possible. If we assume with Carvalho that the majority (presumably he means of both officers and soldiers) "stick to the MFA's ideas," this does not help much at a time when the MFA is visibly divided and no one knows which tendency's ideas will win out. We could even speculate that what are *becoming* the dominant ideas in the MFA will be importantly influenced by the ongoing politicization of the rank and file. Revolutions (and counter-revolutions) are enormously complicated, and only the rash or foolish will venture to predict their course. But they are also periods in which changes which would normally take years can occur in a matter of months or even weeks. The one thing I think we can say with reasonable assurance, no less important for being essentially negative, is that with each day that passes the likelihood of the Portuguese armed forces playing a role similar to that of the Chilean armed forces becomes smaller and smaller.

(August 12, 1975)

(To be continued)

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THE MFA AS A NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT

During its meeting of June 21 [1975], the Revolutionary Council approved the political action plan of the MFA, embodied in the following document:

I. Political Definition

1.1 The MFA is the movement of liberation of the Portuguese people, above parties, which defines as its essential object national independence.

The MFA recognizes that this national independence arises from a process of internal decolonization which can be achieved only through the construction of a socialist society.

1.2 By socialist society, as the final objective to be achieved, is understood a society without classes, achieved by the collectivization of the means of production, eliminating all forms of exploitation of man by man, in which there will be granted to all individuals equal opportunities for education, work, and advancement without distinction of birth, sex, religious belief or ideology.

The road of transition from the present society to a socialist society necessarily passes through various phases, of which the first is marked by the transition period fixed in the Platform of Constitutional Agreement, and the steps of which will be determined by the political and socio-economic evolution of the Portuguese people.

Translated from the text published in *O Comércio de Porto,* June 22, 1975.

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The MFA has already determined, however, that this path will be made by the pluralist route.

1.3 Pluralism means free expression and discussion of opinions, as well as experiences in the construction of the new society, in an open and permanent dialogue with all the Portuguese people.

Socialist pluralism comprehends the coexistence in theory and practice of various forms and conceptions of construction of socialist society. At the same time, the MFA rejects the implantation of socialism by violent and dictatorial methods.

Party pluralism, as is stated in the Platform of Constitutional Agreement, implies the recognition of the existence of various political parties and currents of opinion, even if they do not necessarily defend socialist options. At the same time, it admits an opposition whose criticism can be beneficial and constructive, provided its actions do not oppose the construction of socialist society by democratic means.

The MFA will naturally have the support and backing of the parties which by their political program and practice demonstrate a real interest in the adoption and concretization of the objective means required by the transition to socialism, and will establish with them the necessary alliances and connections.

1.4 During the transition to socialism the political parties ought to play a highly valuable role not only through their pedagogic action aimed at mobilizing and raising the consciousness of the masses but also as vehicles for transmitting popular expression in various forms, including the electoral way.

At the same time it is necessary that electoral processes during the period of transition should be conscientiously integrated into the revolutionary process and should at no time be permitted to become an obstacle to it.

1.5 In accordance with its express vocation as a Movement of National Liberation, the MFA intends that the entire Portuguese people should participate actively in their own revolution, and to this end it will strongly support and establish connections with all unitary grass-roots organizations whose objectives include the concretization and defense of the MFA's program of constructing a socialist society.

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These popular organizations will constitute the embryo of an experimental system of direct democracy by which it is judged possible to achieve the active participation of all the Portuguese people in public administration and in national political life in connection with the local and regional organs of the central power. It will have, in addition, the advantage of promoting, beginning at the base, the convergence of the forces of the various parties through their unity in concretizing common objectives.

However, civilian armed forces will not be permitted, whether or not organized by parties. Nevertheless, popular organizations may be directed, in case of a national emergency and on the initiative and under the control and leadership of the MFA itself, to carry out tasks of self-defense of vital objectives.

Within the armed forces there will not be allowed any kind of political-military organizations, party-related or not, divorced from the MFA, the intention being that all military personnel will be progressively integrated into their own movement.

1.6 The MFA declares its determination to fulfill and cause others to fulfill in an integral fashion the Platform of Constitutional Agreement, freely established with Portuguese political parties, and solemnly affirms that it will denounce and proceed against all attitudes, open or disguised, which violate the pact in question.

1.7 In agreement with the established principles, the MFA considers it to be its duty to make publicly explicit that the Constituent Assembly has as its sole prerogative the patriotic mission to elaborate a political constitution for the Portuguese nation, being forbidden any other kind of official interference in the political or administrative life of the nation.

1.8 In external affairs the MFA will follow a policy of national independence and of contributing to peace and cooperation in Europe and in the world.

Within these parameters alliances and commitments already entered into will be respected, in particular Portugal's participation in NATO in a form which does not prejudice the political-military equilibrium of Europe.

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In the political arena Portugal will follow a strategy of openness to all countries of the world, without interfering in their internal affairs or permitting interference in its own internal affairs, feeling an historical vocation to provide a link between the peoples of Europe and those of the Third World, especially with the fraternal Portuguese-speaking countries.

In the economic arena the nation's foreign policy will be oriented to a progressive diversification of its commercial relations, not allowing any country or bloc to impose, by means of economic relations, any form of domination over the Portuguese people.

II. Exercise of Authority

2.1 From the analysis of the present political situation and its foreseeable evolution there results a necessity for a reinforcement and strengthening of the revolutionary authority of the MFA, indispensable foundation for a state power which will permit the normal and peaceful evolution of the transition to socialism.

There exist *de facto* threats of counter-revolutionary activities fomented outside the country and supported internally by national agents of capitalism and colonialism in the process of being destroyed, which, if not repressed firmly and in an exemplary way, will represent a serious danger to public order and the security of possessions and wealth, with the potential of creating a climate propitious to the return to a fascist regime.

On the other hand, certain manifestations of pseudo-revolutionary leftism, even if sometimes well-intentioned, tend to create anarchical situations profoundly upsetting to a coherent revolutionary process and resulting objectively in strengthening the game which they claim or pretend to be combating.

The conclusion thus emerges that only the exercise of a firm though not essentially repressive authority can guarantee the success of the revolution in which the MFA and the Portuguese people are engaged.

2.2 Thus, we affirm our determination to enforce firmly the laws that encompass the objectives of the Portuguese Revo-

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lution, until such a time as the historic process should demonstrate their inadequacy in the light of concrete social conditions.

2.3 The necessity of repressing with necessary firmness the possible action of armed clandestine groups or organizations makes obligatory the promulgation of a special law, now in preparation, which will permit the punishment of participants in such counter-revolutionary organizations with heavy penalties.

2.4 With respect to the struggle against leftism, it should be carried out essentially in the ideological field, making possible the recovery of well-intentioned elements for the objectives and tasks of the revolution.

Nevertheless, repression of various forms, including armed action if necessary, will be exercised against groups or organizations which by their action and practice systematically disturb public order and show disrespect for the rules laid down for the construction of socialism by the pluralistic road.

2.5 Recognizing that one of the fields in which manifestations of uncontrolled leftism have disturbed the public life of the nation is that of education and teaching, the MFA reaffirms its determination to support the relevant ministry in the re-establishment of a normal and productive environment in which, within the democratic rules of management, the students can fulfill their duty to society, preparing themselves as the workers of the future.

Not forgetting that it is highly desirable that intellectual means should contribute to the raising of a strong revolutionary consciousness, intellectual workers, among whom are included students, have an obligation not to let political activity prejudice their specific work in such a way as to transform them into social parasites.

III. Economic-Financial Policy

3.1 The present economic situation of the country is characterized by the following three basic critical points:

a) Very aggravated disequilibrium in the balance of payments, portending a deficit by the end of the current year much larger than that realized in 1974 which was of the order of 17 billion escudos [$680 million at the current rate of exchange].

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b) High unemployment, amounting to around 250,000 unemployed, equal to 8 percent of the active population.

c) Declining domestic production, posing a threat to national independence and, unless present production conditions are modified, leading by the end of this year to a decrease in the Gross National Product compared to 1974 of the order of 6 percent.

3.2 It is therefore essential that the Portuguese people should have a clear idea of the economic and financial situation of the country, which is characterized by the following facts:

3.2.1 Imports—in large part food—are much larger than exports, possibly exceeding the latter by 50 billion escudos [$2 billion] by the end of this year. This amount is, in large part, owing to the high prices of food and petroleum in the countries of origin.

3.2.2 This deficit is reduced by the remittances of emigrant workers and the receipts of tourism (the latter, as is known, is now faced with a severe crisis).

3.2.3 It is foreseen that by the end of this year the country will have a balance-of-payments deficit of the order of 30 billion escudos [$1.2 billion] which will practically exhaust the foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Portugal (not counting gold reserves).*

3.2.4 The indicated financial situation exists within an economic frame in which the productive wealth of the country, given present tendencies, will decline during the current year by about 6 percent relative to last year, even taking into account an expected increase in the agricultural sector.

3.2.5 The panorama described is very serious, but not alarming, since it corresponds to a socio-political phase of eliminating the errors of monopoly capitalism and latifundism which characterized our country and even the international crisis of capitalism. Nevertheless if the situation is not to get out of hand, it is essential that the Portuguese people take on

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* The gold reserve is reported to be about $1.1 billion valued at the official rate of $42 per ounce. At current market value it would be about $4.4 billion. Whether this amount could be realized through actual sales on the open market or through using the gold as collateral for loans is uncertain. — THE EDITORS

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the responsibility of constructing the new socialist system in which the laboring classes decide consciously to choose between socialism with the relative and temporary sacrifices which its construction requires and capitalism with all the exploitation and repression inherent in it.

3.2.6 *De facto* the destruction of capitalism demands the liquidation of the exploiting power of the big monopolistic, latifundist, and financial bourgeoisie; while the construction of socialism demands work, sacrifice, and political consciousness from the laboring classes looking toward a future society without classes and exploitation. In the short run, however, this does not mean that it will be possible to resolve all the crying injustices of the previous regime, nor that it will be possible to pay a wage to all Portuguese workers corresponding to their just aspirations and real needs.

3.2.7 In these conditions the policy of truth which the MFA has always represented to the Portuguese people requires above all the adoption of certain realistic measures if the working people really want to construct socialism:

a) The limitation of unsupportable wage increases, save in the case of increases in the cost of living and excessive inequities.

b) Diminution of imports, including especially luxury products and those which can be produced within the country.

c) A policy of austerity in consumption.

d) Expansion of internal production, above all of products —like, for example, foodstuffs—which can be substituted for imports or which can increase our exports.

3.3 In the face of the described economic situation which can be considered very serious it is urgent to adopt the following:

a) Prompt and precise measures.

b) A strategy of economic development defined as a function of three critical points: balance of payments, unemployment, and national independence.

c) The future configuration of the political-economic systems, including discussion of the following points:

—Organized control of production by the workers

—Local mobilization for development

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—Organization of the system of planning
—Qualitative sub-systems of the economy in transition (state sector, private sector)
d) Policy of external economic cooperation.

3.4 The two fundamental themes, strategy of economic development and configuration of the economic system, will be urgently discussed by the economic team of the Provisional Government and by the four Ministers without Portfolio representing the parties of the coalition, in combination with the Council of the Revolution, with a view to decisions being taken in the month of July which will make possible the elaboration of a plan of transition for 1976/77/78.

The discussion of these themes and of prompt, precise measures will represent a profound test of the political viability of the present coalition and of its capacity to go forward in a united way toward the real objectives of socialism.

IV. Government and Administration

4.1. Provisional Government: the Provisional Government should function under present circumstances as a unitary government responding rapidly and efficiently to the national and patriotic objectives, already defined, of constructing socialism.

The MFA considers that the grave economic-financial condition of the country demands from the present coalition government the overcoming of natural divergencies and the mastering of a common solution to the problem of economic development.

The MFA considers that the Portuguese people, represented in their great majority by the political parties which compose the present coalition, have the right to demand of these parties that they measure up to their historic duty, on pain of considering the present coalition inadequate to the requirements of the objective necessities of the country.

For these reasons the MFA considers that the discussion of a strategy of economic development and an economic model of society, to be initiated immediately by the Provisional Government and concluded by the end of July, will represent an extremely important test which the Portuguese people have the right to see resolved.

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4.2 Inertia of the state machine—the present state machine, extremely bloated and bureaucratic, is clearly inadequate to the dynamics of the present revolutionary process, responding slowly and with difficulty to demands that are made upon it. To answer this problem, the MFA considers essential:

a) Administrative decentralization.

b) Gradual constitution of a new state apparatus, nonpartisan, organized in dynamic models around immediate fundamental objectives and provided with a personnel showing itself adequate to the requirements of revolutionary dynamism. Along with this, work leading to an administrative reform in depth will be undertaken.

c) A correct policy of reclassification and recuperation for the jobs of state functionaries, purging cases which are clearly beyond recuperation.

d) The initiation of a dialogue between the organs of state power at various levels and corresponding popular unitary organizations; the latter will gradually be given control over these organs of the state apparatus.

e) The elimination from the state machine of procedures which are too complicated and bureaucratic, substituting procedures which are both expeditious and revolutionary and capable of responding to the pressure of needs, while attributing full responsibility to the executors.

4.3 [On administrative decentralization.]

4.4 Linking the MFA to unitary popular structures at the base.

The MFA considers that at the present stage of revolution it is extremely important, even decisive, to strengthen and dynamize the unitary popular structures at the base as a factor determining popular unity and the overcoming of contradictions which exist at the level of political structures at the top.

This new revolutionary line of force does not intend to call into question the legitimacy of the existing political parties, but rather to accomplish, by means of a rank-and-file dynamic based on reality, a movement from below which will give added impetus to unity and consistency. The future association of these unitary popular organs will be able to

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begin to constitute embryos of local organs or assemblies representing the interests of the people which, gradually and through dialogue with local organs of public administration, will provide them with dynamism and a sense of identity with the real, local, popular objectives. The general lines of this road of political orientation are at present the object of study on the part of an MFA working group, set up for that purpose, whose conclusions, formulated on the basis of real existing conditions, will soon be disclosed.

V. Dynamization and Information

5.1 It is recognized that the intended construction of a socialist society by the indicated pluralist road cannot be accomplished without mobilizing and raising the consciousness of the whole Portuguese people, which will lead them to take a positive role in the transition to socialism.

It should be noted that the institution of a real socialism implies essentially an evolution of mentalities of a kind to transform a major part of motivation from the quasi-purely material motivation characteristic of capitalist societies to a spiritual one that will stimulate people to pass from an egotistical and individualistic attitude to their fellows, to an altruistic and collectivist attitude, centering attention and concern on the common good.

This process of mobilization and consciousness raising will only be possible through an adequate information policy which is in urgent need of initiation by means of a profound transformation of the services of social communication.

This does not mean that information should take the monolithic character of oriented propaganda, since that would not be consistent with the pluralist principles followed by the Portuguese Revolution.

But it is necessary that this information should be at the same time truthful, educational, clarifying, and instructive vis-à-vis the people, and not of a kind to excite and confuse them as has hitherto, from time to time, been the case. The MFA sincerely believes that liberty and the socialist option are not incompatible, but it is necessary that the existence of the one should not limit the other.

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5.2 One of the practices necessary for the realization of the indicated objectives consists in transforming one or more daily newspapers, already practically belonging to the state, into official organs whose announcements and doctrine will naturally reflect the positions of the MFA.

It is hoped that by this means the Portuguese people will dispose over daily press organs which are non-controversial, with no ties to political parties, and which follow a general policy of truthfulness and public clarification. Their daily practice will make them eminently respected.

5.3 With the same objective, control over radio and television by the state is necessary, for the purpose of providing to the public in a systematic form the position and doctrine of the MFA concerning political practice and the events of national life.

5.4 The mobilization of public opinion for objectives of national interest should be accomplished by the rational utilization of publicity diffused by the organs of information, which naturally implies the utilization of nationalized publishing enterprises.

5.5 Considering that there exists in Portugal the right to free information, it is recognized that in many cases this right is abused, giving rise to the spreading by press, radio, or television of intentionally slanted news to cause confusion or alarm in public opinion. This happens when certain foreign correspondents, abusing the hospitality which has been extended to them, send to the organs of information which they represent, false or concocted news, intentionally prejudicing the image of Portugal before the world.

Since the press law does not allow decisive and rapid action against these prevaricators, who have violated it until now with impunity, through actions perfectly classifiable as counter-revolutionary, the MFA has decided to proceed directly and effectively against them, promulgating if necessary adequate revolutionary legislation.

5.6 [On steps to be taken to inform the Portuguese emigration of the real situation in the country.]

5.7 The mobilization of the Portuguese people for the socialist road requires, in addition to a new information policy,

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a constant dynamizing action which by its presence and its practice, makes visible and operative the recommendations and programs emanating from the central organs.

For this, military cultural action, intense and adequate, is necessary, together with the unitary popular organizations of the rank and file which, better than anyone else, can reflect the most just concerns and needs of the population. For this action there should be made available the required human and material means, keeping in mind that the Revolution of April 25 was made by the people and that it will be from the people that it derives its strength, its continuity, and its *raison d'être*.

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THE CRISIS IN INDIA

BY AN OBSERVER

This is a letter from a comrade associated with India, who for obvious reasons must remain anonymous. — THE EDITORS

July 24, 1975

Dear Friends,

You asked me to tell you a bit about the Indian situation. I don't know everything, but thought I would try to spell it out a little, to clarify my own thoughts and to state the questions for which I have no answers. I'm also sending you an article from the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of three weeks ago, with which I agree essentially.[1]*

Mrs. Gandhi seems to have brought in the emergency for two main reasons. One, the most immediate, she was under heavy attack from all opposition groups, both right and left, for the electoral malpractices for which she had been convicted by the High Court—and which, if her appeal was not upheld, would mean that in law she must step down. Two, she was probably becoming unable to control the rioting, looting, massive demonstrations, and demoralizing published reports of unrest and of starvation, resulting from the serious economic crisis of the past two years.

India has in fact not been a "democracy" in the accepted sense for a long time—at least since 1967, and in some respects since the first emergency (never repealed) was declared during the border war with China in 1962. The government has wielded

* Notes will be found at the end of the letter.

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many extraordinary powers bequeathed to it by the British, to arrest without trial and sometimes without charges. Before ever this emergency began, there were an estimated 30,000 Communist (Naxalite) or alleged Communist political prisoners, whose torture and general ill conditions had begun to remind one of Saigon. Their plight was in fact investigated and condemned by Amnesty International over a year ago. Several hundred such prisoners have been murdered in jails since 1967. Other massacres by the police and by goons, almost certainly hired by the Congress Party of Mrs. Gandhi, have been carried out in slums and rural areas, among urban poor people, agricultural laborers and poor peasants, especially untouchables (the bottom 15 percent of the people, comparable in former slave status to the U.S. blacks). Since the Naxalite (Maoist) guerrilla movements began in 1967, no one knows how many thousands have been killed. Many were not Naxalites at all, but peasants and laborers protesting against their ever deteriorating conditions. Only two weeks before the emergency was declared, the *Economic and Political Weekly* carried a report of how the Central Reserve Police had cordoned off an area in Bihar State (where famine and unrest have been severe), carried out operations against the people, and shot 15 poor peasants as "suspected Naxalites."[2] And in Andhra State, after the army had been sent in with about 20,000 regular and paramilitary troops in March 1971, the people were actually herded into camps or "strategic hamlets" on the Vietnamese pattern, about three miles apart, in order to cut off food supplies to the guerrillas.

In addition, private massacres by landlords with the tacit support of the police and, presumably, the ruling party have been common. You know perhaps about the murders that took place in Kilvenmani, a village in Thanjavur district of Tamil Nadu—actually one of the two states that does not have a Congress Party government, being governed at the state level by a South Indian party, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhakam. There, 44 men, women, and children of the agricultural laboring untouchable caste were herded into a hut and burned to death by goons hired by their landlords on Christmas Eve, 1968, after they had struck for higher wages and had themselves allegedly killed one blackleg worker. The landlords who organ-

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ized this were well known locally but were exonerated in the courts "for lack of evidence." I've read in left-wing journals of several dozen similar cases in recent years. Indeed, just a few days before the emergency the *Economic and Political Weekly* carried another horror story of how landlords near Patna, the capital of Bihar, had shot or burned to death at least six landless laborers who were protesting against their conditions.[3]

You may also have read how between 650 and 1,000 members and supporters of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) —the centrist, supposedly independent Communist Party and the biggest—were killed by goons hired by the Congress Party before the elections to the West Bengal state legislature in March 1972. In the same period, another 40,000-odd CPM workers and supporters were driven from their homes by state police, by the Central Reserve Police, or by gangs of criminals.[4] The fact that Mrs. Gandhi is now being attacked for minor electoral offenses (using government funds and planes, bureaucratic influence, etc.) is almost laughable in view of what went on elsewhere in India—very similar to Nixon's being attacked over the plumbers' break-in, quite in spite of Vietnam.

In view of all this it is hard to say that Mrs. Gandhi was under attack by those to the "right" of her, as is being said by her supporters and by supporters of the Soviet Union (which, of course, is backing the emergency). For it would be difficult to get any "righter" than the dictatorial powers she had already and has now assumed, the rampant corruption, torture, murder and confinement, the ever growing wealth of the rich and misery of the poor, and the freedom of exploitation afforded to big landlords, to India's own top 75 monopoly firms, and to foreign corporations—still largely British, but increasingly American, also West German, Japanese, and French.

What is meant by "more right" is, I suppose, that the parties of the Right who opposed her would have favored more complete American influence and would have tried to cut out the Soviet Union's investment, trade and powers. The chief of these parties are: the Jan Sangh, a religious nationalist party wanting a Hindu state; its militarized affiliate, the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (two of whose members murdered Gandhi in 1949); and the Congress O, a splinter group from Mrs.

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Gandhi's own Indian National Congress Party, dating from 1971. These parties had agitated for Mrs. Gandhi's resignation after the High Court decision. So, also, had left-wing parties such as the Communist Party (Marxist) and the Socialist Party, and so, indeed, had a sizable number in Mrs. Gandhi's own party. Many leaders of all these and other parties were arrested in the small hours of June 26th. The best known included the Gandhian leader Jaya Prakash Narayan; Morarji Desai and Asoka Mehta of the Congress O; A. B. Vajpayee, L. K. Advani, and K. P. Mulkani of the Jan Sangh Party; Raj Narayan, Charan Singh and Piloo Mody of the BLD, another Congress splinter party; George Fernandes of the Socialist Party (since escaped and reportedly underground); and Jyotiromoy Bosu of the CPM. In Mrs. Gandhi's own party those arrested included such well known M.P.'s as Ramdhan, Chandrasekhar, Mohan Dharia, Mrs. Lakshmikanthamma, and Krishna Kant. The subsequent arrest of prominent liberals like Kuldip Nayar, editor of the *Indian Express*; of the Secretaries of the Gandhi Peace Foundation and the Gandhi Memorial Trust; the Presidents and Secretaries of the Nehru and the Delhi Universities' Students' Unions and the Delhi University Teachers' Union; of Mrs. Charles Lewis, wife of the British director of the Oxford University Press; of the General Secretary of the All India Railwaymen's Union; and of six elderly Gandhians of the Sarvodaya (social service) movement who dared to present a petition of protest, all make clear that this is a broad attack on center liberals as well as on the pro-American Right. Countless left-wing party members have now also been arrested, including E. M. Sankaran Namboodiripad and A. K. Gopalan of the CPM, Kerala State's former Chief Minister and Land Minister.

During the past two decades the Indian government has been trying to use military backing, aid, and trade from all the major industrial powers and to maintain some kind of leeway among them. For the last ten years, however, it has come to rely much more heavily on the Soviet Union, especially for military aid and sales. The USSR also has investments in Indian industries, whose products are made with cheap labor and sold to Eastern Europe or less-developed Asian countries. The Soviet Union has in fact been underwriting Mrs. Gandhi and the

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Congress Party, tacitly cooperating with U.S. and European investors, helping India to become the policeman of South Asia (including, of course, Sikkim which it recently annexed outright, but also Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and even Pakistan to some extent, because of its weakness since the loss of Bangladesh). The goal from both the Soviet and Indian points of view is to keep the subcontinent safe from Chinese influence and also from any hint of revolution. The Communist Party of India (pro-Moscow), a very small party since the CPI split in 1964, has supported all this and actually formed electoral alliances with the Congress Party in the general elections of 1971. With a strategy of supposedly supporting the Congress "Left" and working from within, I think they have helped keep the lid on rebellion and bolstered both Soviet and U.S. influence. Since 1971 they have often been called the "Communist Party of Indira." They're now proving it by giving active support to the emergency.

In short, I agree with the main outlines of the Chinese analysis of what has happened in India, although I think it is oversimplified, for example, in its characterization of the Indian economy as "semi-feudal" and of the Indian big bourgeoisie as purely comprador. What is upsetting is that China has itself played a role in relation to Pakistan and Sri Lanka not dissimilar to that of the Soviet Union in relation to India and Bangladesh —that is, it has condoned the most savage repression, and supported regional tyrants and indirectly Western imperialism, in order to oppose the Soviet Union. In Sri Lanka things are more complicated; however, that small island's tyrannical government retains the support of all three major powers, all of whom presumably prefer that it not become a fount of instability throughout South Asia.

The main opposition to Mrs. Gandhi in the past year has been Jaya Prakash Narayan's movement, chiefly in North India. He is an elderly Gandhian "socialist" (social democrat), a former close friend of Gandhi and of Nehru, Mrs. G's own father. (By the way, Mrs. Gandhi is no relation to Gandhi, as the Western papers sometimes claim. Her husband just happened to have the same name, and she is of course the daughter of the first Prime Minister, Nehru, who died in 1964.) Narayan

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led a populist movement of protest against corruption, inflation, food maldistribution, and repression. I don't think he had a clear political program—he wanted mainly to force certain reforms and, after the court judgment came, to obtain Mrs. Gandhi's resignation. I think he was probably quite sincere but that, like most Gandhians, he had no clear notion of the nature of the state, of class structure and struggle, or of the dimensions of international power. He encouraged student and middle-class supporters but steered away from labor unions, poor peasants, or agricultural laborers—the mass of India's poor. He allowed the "right-wing" parties mentioned above to get on his bandwagon, and at various times said he didn't mind their support if they worked hard, and that he couldn't see any reason for nationalizing the 75 top monopolies (as some in the left of his movement were demanding). It was rumored that his movement was receiving funds from the CIA, and that may well be true. It is certainly probable that if his movement had succeeded in pulling Mrs. Gandhi down and causing a debacle in the Congress government, it would have been replaced by one relying more heavily on the United States, and less on the Soviet Union. At the same time, I'm not sure the United States seriously wanted to remove Mrs. Gandhi, rather than perhaps simply to scare her back into greater dependence on them and less on the USSR. This is the main question I can't answer, for I don't know what agreement, if any, these two beauties have regarding India. It *looks* as though, for the last four years, the U.S. government has covertly agreed to let the Soviet Union police South Asia against Chinese influence, and take both India and Bangladesh under its wing, in return for untouched profits and freedom of investment (in light industry, branch plants, fertilizers and other lucrative assets, as well as in more traditional raw-materials plantations in cooperation with the British). And, of course, in return for the crushing of revolutionary movements.

The immediate future may hinge on the answer to this question—what is the U.S. planning for India now? For they are at present playing hands off, strictly no comment. (Since the emergency, the British, West Germans, Dutch, Swedes, the International Development Assistance and the World Bank have

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granted India fresh supplies of aid to the amount of about $226 million at the Western aid consortium meeting in Paris, which eases the balance of payments for the coming year, allows the government to plan large imports of rice and edible oils, and makes less serious last year's huge trade gap of about $1.4 billion. The United States and Canada have not yet made fresh aid commitments for the coming year, but the government of India hopes that they will do so soon.) I suspect in fact that the U.S. government was caught unaware by the court verdict and popular outcry against Mrs. Gandhi, and even more by the emergency. They may be waiting to see what happens—whether Mrs. G can make it stick so that they can safely perpetuate aid and trade relations with her. This seems likely, especially in view of the spirit of Helsinki, space-détente, and all. Or, they may decide to try to bring her down and back someone more unequivocally pro-Western in view of the numerous arrests of hitherto pro-Western figures. Or, they may not want that either —they may want a candidate satisfactory to the Soviet Union at any cost, because they feel they can't go it alone against unrest and eventual revolution in South Asia without the Soviet Union's full cooperation. I don't know. I also don't know how the Indian army is shaping up; there are rumors of some reluctance to support Mrs. Gandhi to the last, but also of general enthusiasm. Some of the top monopoly houses, such as the Birlas and Tatas (the two biggest), supported her as soon as she brought in the emergency. They will probably all support her as long as she doesn't tamper with them but goes only after small-time smuggling and corruption, because they are afraid of more unrest. Ditto the landlords. Strikes, of course, are forbidden under the emergency. We saw anyway how Mrs. Gandhi treated them during the brutal crushing of the railroad strike last year.

I suspect that, in spite of her tough line, Mrs. Gandhi is over a barrel, and I am not quite sure she can stay in office for long. To forestall massive rioting, strikes, and civil disobedience, she is promising "21 points" which will supposedly improve the economy—things like serious land reform, housing and plots of land for landless laborers, rationing, curbs on inflation, a moratorium on rural debts, etc. At present, prices have gone

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down a little, and some smugglers and racketeers have been arrested. There is little hope, however, that over the long run she can do much of what she promises, or even wants to. She made the same promises ("War on Poverty," etc.) at every previous election and nothing came of them. She can't carry out land reform or curb profits because her main political, military, and financial backers are landlords and big business (and small). She is clearly trying to placate the more organized poor and especially the urban petty bourgeoisie who have been hard hit by inflation and are politically volatile and restless (the main supporters of the JP movement).

The "real Left," who are not cooperating with Mrs. Gandhi, seem to me, realistically, to be in a rather weak position, at least temporarily. They have two main prongs—the CPM or centrist parliamentary Communist Party, and several factions of Maoists or "Naxalites" who broke away or were expelled from it after 1967. The former has, I think, weakened itself by years of opportunism. Most recently it was supporting the JP movement and making electoral alliances with non-Congress rightist parties, on the old theory that "if we use them to smash the Congress, then we can smash *them*." It doesn't work, partly because they do not have the leadership in such movements and so cannot determine the program, and partly because it makes their followers lose faith in them. So now they are set back and scattered, without a disciplined revolutionary force, some of them arrested, others tempted to go along with Mrs. Gandhi, and many of them unsuitably trained as parliamentarians, union leaders, lawyers, or village bureaucrats, for a system which Mrs. G has just disbanded. They have, however, some young cadres who have now gone underground and may start to organize a revolutionary movement—it has been pending for some time, since there were serious divisions within the party over the leadership's parliamentary policies.

The Naxalites were badly crushed in 1970-1971. Most of their leaders were jailed and some were shot, as were many cadres. In West Bengal, one of their two former strongholds (the other being Andhra Pradesh), the government cleaned up most of them during and after the war with Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, under cover of the glow of victory.

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They have split into several factions, partly confused by China's support of the Pakistani dictatorship and of the 1971 repression of revolutionaries in Sri Lanka. A large group led by Satya Narain Singh and Pulla Reddy, still called the CPI-ML, had started mass organizing again after the death in prison of Charu Mazumdar in 1972. It was supporting the JP movement until shortly before the emergency, when it apparently became disillusioned by the rightist influence in the movement. The other significant Maoist group is the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee led by Nagi Reddy, which carried on a long struggle among peasants and tribal people in 1966-1970 but was also badly mauled in 1971. These groups and smaller Maoist factions are all now banned, among a group of 26 parties and organizations of the Right and Left proscribed under the emergency.[5] Exactly as in 1971 during the Bangladesh war, the government is trying to crush them quietly, under cover of its more open attacks upon the pro-U.S. rightists. Some have been arrested; many of course were in prison already. The rest have re-formed underground and in some ways are encouraged by the emergency, knowing that it will bring much larger numbers to their side. They and other banned groups have begun underground publications which are widely distributed. Although I do not know the details, I know that there has been some mass violence by the government, not reported in the Western or the official Indian press. There is also, however, resistance by the common people and by the Left: in early July, for example, a mob killed the District Collector (the main government officer) of Arrah, a district in Bihar State where poverty and resistance have been most serious in the past two years.

The main hope is that the Maoists can now ally with the young folks in the CPM and with regional radical parties, such as the Lal Nisan of Maharashtra, in a movement that does not take its cues from China or anywhere else, for what will surely be a long, long haul. All the far left groups are now calling for restoration of civil rights and for the real implementation of Mrs. Gandhi's 21 points to help the poor. They won't get them, I am sure, but they are reasonable demands and will unite the left and liberal opposition.

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I've made this long but hope it clarifies things somewhat. As the Left is saying, the main gain is that, now "the mask is off," Mrs. Gandhi can't pose any more as a gentle but strong humanitarian. It may hasten a revolutionary development, but it will be agonizing and, I think, very prolonged because there is no well-organized movement and no leader of the caliber of a Mao, a Ho, or a Fidel. Nevertheless, there *is* a movement, leaders will come, and meanwhile there are people. Six hundred million of them! Despite the news media, they are *not* sheep; tens of thousands are already struggling hard, and will be followed by millions. The agricultural laborers alone have increased phenomenally in numbers since 1960, and in several states are now 30 to 40 percent of the population. In many areas they *must* fight or starve.

Internationally, China of course has condemned Mrs. Gandhi's crackdown. Unfortunately, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has not, but has instead given verbal support immediately after she declared the emergency.[6] It may, however, mean very little for it was chiefly a condemnation of the conspiratorial activities of India's right-wing, pro-U.S. groups, some of whom did have it in for Mrs. Gandhi. I hope it means no more. For it's probably true to say that for Indian revolutionaries, the Indochinese victories have lit up Asia like nothing else for a quarter century, and mark a turning point.

Yours with fraternal greetings,

NOTES

1. "Indira Wields the Iron Rod," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (July 4, 1975), p. 8.
2. "Kill Them and Call Them Naxalites," *Economic and Political Weekly* (June 7, 1975).
3. "Murder to Landlords' Order," *Economic and Political Weekly* (June 14, 1975).
4. See, for example, Jyoti Basu, "On Fascist Terror in West Bengal—An Appeal to the World Press, 23/3/72," in *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* Vol. II, No. 2 (1972), pp. 224-227, and Biplab Dasgupta, "'Gandhism' in West Bengal," *Journal of Contemporary Asia,* Vol. II, No. 3 (1972), pp. 255-269.
5. Since this letter was written the Indian Parliament, dominated by the Congress Party, has ratified the emergency indefinitely. On August 7 it amended the constitution retroactively, to prevent the courts from judging Mrs. Gandhi's electoral behavior or her government's actions under the emergency. Anyone in India may now be

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arrested "preventively" and held without trial indefinitely. The Communist Party of India has supported these actions, as have the conservative, religious Muslim League and the openly fascist Shiv Sena of western India. The rest of the parliamentary opposition walked out. Some of those detained are alleged racketeers, but traders and small shopkeepers are also reported to have been jailed on trumped-up charges by venal police and bureaucrats. See, e.g., "Liberty Snuffed Out," by Peter Gill, *The Sunday Telegraph,* London (July 27, 1975), p. 15.

6. See the *New York Times* (June 28, 1975).

MADAME GANDHI: RHETORIC AND REPRESSION

BY HARRY MAGDOFF

I have been asked to comment on recent developments in India. The news of the crisis stimulated the recall of two illuminating experiences of a 1972 trip to India. At Hyderabad I gave a talk at the Community Development Institute. The audience consisted of community workers (village officials as well as local representatives of regional and national government departments) from many parts of India. They had been brought to the institute for several weeks of refresher courses.

My talk dealt primarily with the apparent neglect of agriculture in India's national planning schemes and the problems arising from this neglect. During the post-lecture discussion, one after another of the participants arose to explain how even limited reform measures they tried to introduce in their locality had been stymied by the active interference of the real wielders of power in the village: the larger landowners and moneylenders. Reforms, such as distribution of land to landless la-

These brief comments were prepared at the request of the editors of *New India Bulletin.* The *Bulletin* is a news and analysis journal of the recently organized Indian Peoples' Association in North America (IPANA). For a sample complimentary copy, write to Hari Sharma at 8027 Government Street, Burnaby 2, B.C., V5A 2E1, Canada.

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borers, were suppressed by force and violence exercised by local police or hired thugs under the control of the local elite. The main thrust of the comments from these minor representatives of the political establishment was that very little could be done about improving rural conditions because of the power structure in the village.

These apparently well-intentioned and frustrated community officials were not ready to reach, or at least openly face up to, the necessary conclusions from their daily experience. But the implication of their vivid reports was clear enough. Any meaningful change in food production and distribution, and in the standard of living of the mass of the agricultural population, could not take place without a revolutionary change in the villages, much less at the national level.

Interestingly enough, this perception was not entirely foreign to Madame Gandhi. Before starting on the tour of Indian cities and rural areas, I had attended a seminar on Imperialism, Independence, and Social Transformation held in Delhi. Towards the end of the seminar sessions, the non-Indian participants were invited to meet Madame Gandhi. During the discussion with the Prime Minister a question was asked about the inadequacy, or failure, of India's land-reform programs. Madame Gandhi answered that meaningful land reform would not be achieved until the peasants undertook to do it by and for themselves! The irony of this answer arose from the fact that attempts by organized peasants to do just that had been forcefully suppressed, including killing and mass imprisonment of activists, not only by village authorities but also by the use of the police, army, and judicial apparatus of higher governmental levels.

It strikes me that what is happening now is an intensification of the contraposition of radical-sounding rhetoric and energetic repression of radical action, with new wrinkles because of increasing frictions among factions of the ruling classes, and the more overt discontent and opposition among the petty bourgeoisie, professionals, and intellectuals. This type of development is not surprising in a society that cannot at one and the same time sustain its socio-economic structure and eliminate mass hunger, disease, and misery. Left-sounding

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rhetoric, accompanied by stabs at minor reforms, helps to dampen mass discontent, while repression of revolutionary opposition protects existing property rights and profit-making opportunities of large landowners, merchants, speculators, financiers, and industrial capitalists.

In recent years, the living conditions of the poor and even the not-so-poor have been getting worse, hard as this may be to imagine. In addition, economic difficulties have increased for some of the more favored sectors of the population, an accompaniment of inflation, balance-of-payment predicaments, and stagnation. These developments have created added tensions in ruling circles since attempts to improve the status of one sector of the upper stratum result in impingement on the rights and profits of other sectors. Under these circumstances, greater power is needed by the government to pursue a path chosen from an increasingly narrow range of alternatives. Thus, apart from issues of personality, machine politics, and individual power-seeking which influence the concrete shape of recent events, objective conditions were ripe for a more open dictatorial regime. From all the evidence that has been coming in, it is clear that the essential nature of the regime and the society has not changed. Elimination of democratic rights under the guise of maintaining stability, purportedly against extremists of the Right and Left, may be aimed in part at giving the government greater freedom of action in administering a crisis-ridden economy, but its main import is to prevent the masses from organizing and taking matters into their own hands.

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By Efraín Barquero

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There are a number of international organizations making a lot of noise about something as abstract as the human rights of people they do not know.

(Translated by Robert Márquez, David McMurray, and David Cherician)

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BOOKS

NKRUMAH'S DREAM

By Ann Seidman

Black Star—A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah, by Basil Davidson. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974, 225 pp., $7.95.

Many great men and women have emerged in the leadership of the struggle for the liberation from colonialism on the vast African continent. Basil Davidson, who has done so much to illuminate the history of that struggle, asserts that history will place Kwame Nkrumah "at the heart and center of the whole great process of primary decolonization." Not a few African leaders concur: Sekou Touré made him co-president of Guinea after the coup in Ghana; Kaunda named a college in Zambia after him; and Cabral recalled him as "a companion in our struggle."

In telling the story of the life of this first president of the first sub-Saharan African nation to gain political independence after the Second World War, Davidson explains:

> But today, looking at his life and work, one has to find a path to truth through all the blame and praise that followed in his wake; and it is not easy to find this path. The fact is that no final judgment is possible as yet; and a full biography of Nkrumah cannot be sensibly attempted at this time.
>
> What follows here is an attempt to show and to explain him in the framework of his times, an effort at comprehension that other historians, better instructed in the future, may correct or improve.

He adds:

> To some extent, necessarily, it is a personal memoir, for I knew him fairly well through many of those years . . . but I have tried to balance my own opinions against those of others, for or against, and to tell this story "as it was."

Ann Seidman spent eight years teaching and doing research in Ghana, Tanzania, and Zambia.

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Davidson's book does add valuable insights into the man and his attempt to lead the Ghanaian people in their struggle for political and economic independence. He portrays the contradictory character of Nkrumah: a man of ideas forced to become a man of action, seeking to improve the life of his people with little real knowledge of them due to prolonged absence from Ghana in his youth, aiming to build a continental revolution in a relatively small country where his countrymen accept "a gentle process of reform . . . as being quite enough."

Davidson describes how Nkrumah came to partial power in 1951, leading a broad coalition for national liberation, and was forced to compromise with the still-powerful British rulers, accepting the inhibiting framework of inherited political and economic institutions they imposed. He raises the question whether Nkrumah should have accepted this hobbled status, especially in view of later events. The alternative, in a continent still fully and openly ruled by the colonial powers, seemed to be an almost hopeless struggle against overwhelming odds. Nkrumah's decision did create the conditions for Ghana's attainment of political independence, a first and major breakthrough in the struggle for national liberation which, in the next decade, saw over 40 nations freed from outright foreign rule. As Davidson points out, continuation of the underlying institutional structure which chained Ghana's cocoa economy to the world capitalist system was the heavy price he and his followers paid.

Davidson exposes the growing weaknesses of Nkrumah's political party as its "petty bourgeois" leadership succumbed to opportunistic, bureaucratic, and authoritarian practices which rendered it incapable of leading the nation forward beyond the hollow shell of political independence. He explains Nkrumah's inability to deal effectively with these increasing problems as the decade of the 1960s opened:

> Nkrumah can be criticized for much that he did or failed to do; but the underlying truth, by this time, was that he had become the victim of a situation that increasingly escaped his control, or even his influence. Trying to recover some control, he moved increasingly towards a personal assertion of authority, substituting his will for that of the party, just as the party had long since, by now, substituted its will for that of the voters. . . . [By the mid-sixties] the manipulation of factions was fast becoming Nkrumah's sole effective mode of action: his resignation could be the only other choice.

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Davidson points out that resignation and "going to the people" would have required "long years of obscure and patient work" to build an alternative to the CPP. Nkrumah, apparently convinced that the keys to power were now in his hand, sought instead to use them to open the "locks that still imprisoned Ghana in its colonial past."

In interpreting Nkrumah's role in the historic process of national liberation unfolding in Africa, it is important to consider whether he should have accepted the political compromises that granted a political independence shackled by British institutions. It is also crucial to analyze why he failed, over time, to direct sufficient attention to the problem of creating essential new institutions capable of contributing more effectively to restructuring Ghana's lop-sided political economy. A continuing, ever more penetrating analysis of these reasons is vital, not merely to better understand Nkrumah and his times, but to enable other parties and their leaders to learn from Ghana's experience.

First, Nkrumah never really understood the nature of the class struggle in Ghana. While in Guinea, years after he was deposed, he wrote a pamphlet on class struggle in Africa; but while he was president, he explicitly denied that Ghana was being increasingly rent by a serious internal class conflict. His verbal emphasis was on the danger of neocolonial forces—the powerful foreign companies that continued to dominate Africa—but he failed to expose the emergence of the wealthy cocoa farmers-cum-traders-cum-businessmen as an increasingly powerful political-economic force thwarting essential internal structural change. Efforts to organize the sharecroppers in the cocoa belt—perhaps as many as 200,000 migrant laborers who received only a third of the crop while the landowners kept two thirds—were effectively halted: it was argued they might weaken the cocoa farmers, the "backbone of the nation." Trade unions were, as Davidson shows, gradually weakened and tied into the ruling party structure. Acceptance of orthodox Western advice—still, today, being peddled throughout Africa—to control wages in the face of rising prices alienated the masses of wage earners.

Nkrumah's lack of understanding of this growing conflict was a critical cause of his failure to even attempt to build the CPP around the urban workers and rural poor who might have pressured the party and state machinery into more meaningful efforts to restructure the political economy.

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Secondly, despite his scathing attacks on neocolonialism and verbal endorsement of socialism, Nkrumah and his party failed to grasp the key to initiating an effective transitional stage towards a more nationally integrated, balanced economy capable of attaining meaningful economic independence, namely, state control of the "commanding heights": basic industry, the banks, export-import and internal wholesale trade. No measures were adopted to achieve state control of the profitable Ashanti gold mines; only those which were unprofitable were taken over. The State Enterprises Corporation, created to manage Ghanaian participation in industry, was essentially a typical autonomous British development corporation. Like its counterparts in other newly independent African states, it sought to implement an import-substitution industrialization program. In the context of Ghana's distorted inherited market, this could only serve to reinforce the nation's external dependence on foreign firms for machinery, equipment, parts, and materials to meet the luxury and semi-luxury demands of the narrow high-income group associated with export-enclave growth. No long-term industrial strategy was formulated to spread productive employment opportunities into all regions of an increasingly integrated economy capable of raising the living standards of the broad masses of the population. The banks were left entirely in the hands of the foreign firms (Barclays, now closely associated with the Bank of America, and the Bank of West Africa, a member of the Standard Group in which Chase Manhattan owns 15 percent of the shares); the only exception was a small, supposedly "competitive" state bank. The state-operated importing house, GNTC, was managed by a former United Africa Company official, still on pension from the latter company.

It should not be surprising that, as Ghana's cocoa farmers doubled their output from 1955 to 1965, the continued external dependence of the political economy left the nation entirely vulnerable to the collapse of world cocoa prices.

Third, Nkrumah's efforts to build pan-African unity did much, as Davidson emphasizes, to help lay the foundation for the Organization of African Unity. But the same problems that led to Nkrumah's downfall in Ghana plagued the continental organization. As long as the heads of state represent the newly emergent classes which benefit from the status quo, the OAU cannot effectively achieve the kind of unity required to build continental political-economic independence.

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Davidson concludes:

The view for tomorrow is therefore that Nkrumah's aims were the right ones, and that their realization will become increasingly possible as conditions ripen, and as other strategists take up the further struggle for liberation. These strategists will succeed in the measure that circumstances, as well as their insight and courage, enable them to do what Nkrumah did not do, or could not do: in the measure that they undertake and carry through the work of building democratic organizations which become the vehicles of mass participation as well as mass support movements in which the mass of ordinary people really "make, enshrine, and uphold the fundamental law of the land."

To succeed, these strategists will need to learn the primary lessons of Nkrumah's failure: they will need to build their political base around the masses of urban workers and unemployed, as well as the exploited rural poor, imbuing them with a conscious ideology focused on the need for structural change. On this foundation, they must formulate a long-term development strategy to restructure the political economy, making the essential institutional changes at the outset in the critical area of the "commanding heights" to ensure its implementation. Over time, it is to be hoped that those who embark on this path, armed with courage and patience, will weld Africa's 350-million population into the powerful industrialized continental power of which Nkrumah dreamed.

What these (Third World) countries need most are long-term investments. If our government is not going to support us, there is going to be less investment. The answer may be a multinational approach. By this I mean the Germans, the Swiss, the World Bank, and others share in the investment. Then six countries are involved, not one. If something goes wrong, the countries can get tough and do things. You don't go to war, but maybe everybody refuses to give the offending country credits.

—Harold Geneen, Chairman of ITT, *Business Week*, November 3, 1974

* * *

Gunboats are as necessary for international order as police cars are for domestic order. Smaller nations are not really worried about American atom bombs any more than the Mafia is. And smaller nations are not going to behave reasonably—with a decent respect for the interests of others, including the great powers—unless it is costly to them to behave unreasonably.

—Dr. Irving Kristol, Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values at New York University, *The Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 1972

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CORRESPONDENCE

CONCERNING "ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES"

By Arthur MacEwan

Naved Hamid's article about Pakistan ("Alternative Development Strategies") which appeared in the October 1974 issue of MR was a useful review of events leading up to that country's recent crisis.

In relation to today's situation in Pakistan, however, the article is very misleading. By portraying the current regime as one which could choose to follow a popular alternative development strategy, Naved Hamid is helping to create an illusion that has been important in buttressing the regime's power. Let me explain.

In Pakistan, popular opposition brought the downfall of the military-based regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. Those governments had ruled on behalf of a coalition among the feudal and capitalist classes and the state bureaucracy. The stability of that coalition, plus massive foreign aid, led to significant economic expansion in the 1960s. But the expansion was accompanied by increasing inequality, social dislocation, corruption, and costly military adventures against India.

As a result, throughout the 1960s the masses became more and more disaffected and alienated from the regime. Yet the regime was successful—through repression, the use of Islam, and other devices—in preventing the development of any effective organized Left. When massive riots in 1969 pushed the government into crisis, there was no organized Left that could step forward.

There were, however, demagogues who recognized the power of the masses and saw how it could be exploited through a populist rhetoric. In East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) the man

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was Sheik Mujibur Rahman, and the rhetoric was regional autonomy with a tinge of social democratic reforms. In West Pakistan (now Pakistan), it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and his Peoples Party with populist and even anti-imperialist slogans.

Bhutto, through a series of events which need not be elaborated here, now rules what is today Pakistan. But no one knows better than Bhutto that he owes his power to the rebellion of the Pakistani people and his ability to contain and use that rebellion. Accordingly, he has continued to exploit a populist rhetoric and even make certain substantive steps to appease the masses. For example, the Bhutto regime nationalized several enterprises and has made some minimal moves toward land reform.

But these acts have changed only the form by which the ruling groups maintain their power, and even then the form has not changed much. The real nature of the Bhutto regime has been more clearly revealed by the development of firm and positive relations between the Peoples Party and landlord and capitalist interests; the continuing role of the state bureaucracy; the increasing repression against the Left, including the left wing of the Peoples Party; and the firming up of Pakistan's relations with imperialism.

Still, a popular rhetoric is essential to Bhutto. And an article like Naved Hamid's helps to build that rhetoric by attempting to establish an apparent separation between the current regime and the highly despised regimes of the 1960s. Responsibility for the nation's problems is attributed to the policies of the 1960s; the new regime, according to Naved Hamid, has the opportunity to follow a new and popular path. Hogwash!

The Bhutto regime is as thoroughly tied to the feudal, capitalist, bureaucratic, and imperialist interests as were those of his predecessors. They relied openly on the military to maintain themselves. Bhutto, to be sure, has relied more heavily on ideological manipulation and obfuscation; but, as events of the past few months demonstrate, he too is shifting to a greater dependence on direct repression.

(Readers wishing to pursue these matters should look at the MR Press book *Imperialism and Revolution in South Asia,* edited by K. Gough and H. Sharma.)

March 1975

Arthur MacEwan
Economics Department
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

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(*Continued on inside back cover*)

she lived to see the triumph of the latest, and one hopes the last, struggle to live of the Vietnamese people, whom she loved so dearly. A memorial service is being planned for September 11, but unfortunately this issue of MR will reach subscribers only after it has been held. We extend condolences and sympathy to Corliss, and Helen's sons, Robin, Bill, and Albert Lamb.

A letter from Peking by Said Salim reads in part as follows: "While reading through a very interesting and important article entitled 'Imperialism and Revolution in Africa,' by Azinna Nwafor (MR, April 1975), and while underlining the following passage on pp. 18-19 and checking it word for word against the available original, as is my 'chronic' habit (Lenin, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia,* Moscow 1956, p. 654), I discovered that 'contributions' had been substituted for 'contradictions.' The passage should read, with the correct original being underlined: '. . . compatible . . . with the full recognition of the negative and dark sides of capitalism, with the full recognition of the profound and all-sided social *contradictions* which are inevitably inherent in capitalism, and which reveal the historically transient character of this economic regime.'" That's one we certainly should have caught before sending the ms. to the printer. For while Lenin never denied capitalism's contributions, he never in the world would have called them "all-sided social contributions." Thanks to Said Salim whose services as copy editor and proofreader we could make good use of!

Owing to bad planning (or rather no planning at all), we find ourselves with a backlog of material accepted for publication sufficient to fill the magazine for months to come. Since we must always assume that developments somewhere in the world will pre-empt space that had not been set aside (as, e.g., Portugal in this and next month's issues), this means that working off the backlog will be a very slow process. In the meantime, two inevitabilities result: (1) we shall have to be more selective than usual in accepting new submissions and more strict in insisting on length limitations, and (2) whatever is accepted will normally have to take a place at the end of a long waiting list.

The annual MR Associates appeal letter will have reached most subscribers before this issue, which we are deliberately holding up so as to allow more time on the newsstands for the summer issue. Non-subscribers who would like to have a copy of the letter can get one (or more) by dropping us a line including name, address, and zip code. As usual, or rather more than usual, we have financial problems which only you can enable us to survive. But please remember that, as the letter says, joining the Associates is more than just contributing to a good cause. If you are a book buyer, you can soon save much more than the membership fee. Details in the letter.

A Conference on Marxian Economics, sponsored by the New York University Dept. of Economics, will take place on October 10 and 11, at Tisch Hall, New York University, New York City, N.Y. 10001. The general theme is "Advanced Capitalism and the Transition to Socialism." There will be panels on the class structure of advanced capitalism, the current crisis and its "remedies," the nature of socialist planning, and related topics. The participants include James Becker, Raford Boddy, James Crotty, Stanley Diamond, David Gordon, David Levey, Elsie Olsen, Anwar Shaikh and Paul Sweezy. For further information contact James Becker, Dept. of Economics, NYU, Washington Square, New York City.

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